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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Priority No. 2 
v. : 
STEPHEN PINO, : Qase No. 940370-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE PF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for automobile 
homicide, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-207 (1995). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 1994). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Did the Trial Court Properly Conclude That the 
Warrantless Blood Draw, Performed Without Defendant's Consent, 
but After His Arrest, Was Justified by Exigent Circumstances? 
The question of whether the warrantless blood draw was 
constitutionally justified is most aptly described as one of 
Mfact-to-law." Hence, though reviewed for "correctness," the 
trial court's ruling is accorded a measure of deference. State 
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 (Utah 1994). In contrast, the 
suppression court's findings of underlying historical facts are 
subject to reversal only if clearly erroneous. Id. at 939 n.4. 
B. Does Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(6) (1995), Permit 
Admission of the Blood Test? 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Phathammavong. 860 P.2d 1001, 
1002 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Peterson. 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 
1991) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(6) (1995): 
Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath 
alcohol content or drug content is admissible 
except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence 
or the constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(1)(a) (1995): 
A person operating a motor vehicle in this 
state is considered to have given his consent 
to a chemical test or tests of his breath, 
blood, or urine for the purpose of 
determining whether he was operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited under Section 
41-6-44 . . . 
2 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with automobile homicide, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
207(2) (a) (1995); kidnaping, a second degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-3 01 (1995); and leaving the scene of an 
accident, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-29 (1993) (R. 1-2). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress blood test results 
on January 21, 1994, alleging that the blood draw had been 
obtained in violation of his federal and state constitutional 
rights (R. 30-31). Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court denied the motion in a memorandum decision (R. 39-45) . 
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to 
automobile homicide and the remaining counts were dismissed (R. 
83-89) . 
The trial court sentenced defendant to one to 15 years 
in the Utah State Prison and imposed various fines and fees (R. 
104-05). The trial court stayed execution of defendant's 
sentence pending the outcome of this appeal. Id. 
Defendant's bail pending appeal was revoked on June 7, 1994 and 
3 
his previously imposed sentenced was ordered executed (R. 24 0-42) . 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
The trial court's memorandum decision denying 
defendant's motion to suppress accurately recites the pertinent 
facts (R. 39-45) (a complete copy is attached in the addendum). 
The trial court's factual findings are therefore reproduced here, 
adding citations to the transcript of the hearing on the motion 
to suppress: 
1. On Tuesday, November 30, 1993, at 
approximately 2:30 P.M., a motor vehicle accident 
causing serious injuries occurred on the 1-15 
freeway south of Leeds, Utah, in Washington County 
[Transcript of suppression hearing, March 17, 
1994, ST. 298-99, 303-04, 350, 359]. 
2. Trooper [Dene] Kay of the Utah Highway 
Patrol went to the scene of the accident and 
served as the investigating officer [ST. 
372] . 
3. Sergeant Jim Lloyd of the Utah Highway 
Patrol was called out by his dispatcher and 
directed to the Dixie Regional Medical Center 
in St. George, Utah, to make contact with one 
of the persons involved in the accident, the 
[d]efendant[,] Stephen Pino [ST. 298-301]. 
4. [Defendant] had been taken into custody by 
Officer Tom Fjermestad of the St. George City 
police department, who then placed [defendant] 
under arrest for Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol or Drugs[,] as he drove [defendant] to the 
4 
Dixie Regional Medical Center [ST, 352, 357-59, 
361] . 
5. Prior to placing [defendant] under arrest 
Officer Fjermestad was presented with the 
following facts and information: 
a. While stopped at the stoplight 
on Telegraph Street and 3050 East, 
adjacent to Exit #10 of the 1-15 
Freeway, [Officer] Fjermestad 
observed a small, silver colored, 
four door car come off the 1-15 
off-ramp, drive directly to the 
front of his patrol vehicle and 
stop there blocking his car in the 
left hand turn lane of the 
intersection (T. 28)1[ST. 350]. 
b. After the small silver car 
stopped, a man and woman, later 
identified as Mr. and Mrs. Doug 
Robison, exited the silver car and 
approached the passenger side of 
[Officer] Fjermestad's vehicle 
while waving their arms 
ufrantically" and appearing to be 
"very upset'' (T. 29) [ST. 350] . 
c. Two other gentlemen approached 
the driver's side of the patrol car 
from a pick-up truck that had also 
traveled to the intersection with 
the silver car (T. 29) [ST. 356, 
359, 361-62]. 
1
 The trial court's memorandum decision contains internal 
citations to the preliminary hearing transcript (T.), held on 
December 13, 1994. The preliminary hearing transcript is numbered 
in the record on appeal at R. 109-194. 
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d. A "Mexican male/' later 
identified as [defendant], exited 
the back seat of the silver car and 
ran to the back seat of the patrol 
car, opened the back door and sat 
down in the back seat [ST. 350]. 
e. The two men from the pick-up 
truck told [Officer] Fjermestad 
that they had witnessed an accident 
on 1-15. The [sic] saw a "Mexican 
male" leave the black vehicle at 
the accident scene and try to get 
into a "Toyota-like" pick-up truck. 
That attempt was rebuffed by a man 
in the "Toyota-like" truck (T. 30) 
[ST. 361-63] . 
f. The men from the pick-up truck 
then told [Officer] Fjermestad that 
they saw the "Mexican male" jump 
onto the small silver car, hang 
onto the windshield wipers, and 
force the small silver car to stop. 
The man then ran to the passenger 
rear window of the small silver 
car, broke open the window of the 
small silver car and get inside. 
The small silver car then drove off 
(T. 30) [ST. 363]. 
g. The two men from the pick-up 
truck were concerned for the safety 
of the occupants of the small 
silver car, so they followed it to 
the encounter with Officer 
Fjermestad [ST. 361]. 
h. Officer Fjermestad observed 
some small lacerations on the inner 
side of [defendant's] right 
forearm. 
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i. Officer Fjermestad asked 
[defendant] if the vehicle was 
stolen, and [defendant] replied 
that the car was his wife's and 
that she was driving. 
j. Officer Fjermestad noticed a 
"very strong odor" of alcohol on 
[defendant's] breath and noted that 
[defendant's] eyes were "extremely 
bloodshot" (T. 32) [ST. 354]. 
k. While conducting his 
investigation at the intersection 
of Telegraph Street and 3050 East, 
Officer Fjermestad received a radio 
report of a "car-jacking" and that 
a "Mexican male had hijacked a car" 
(T. 32) [ST. 361]. 
1. Thereafter Officer Fjermestad 
received a request from Lieutenant 
Flowers of the Utah Highway Patrol 
to take [defendant] to the hospital 
for a blood test. 
6. On the basis of the information received 
over the radio and from the conversations he 
had with the occupants of the pick-up truck 
that followed the small silver car, plus his 
observations of [defendant's] bloodshot eyes, 
the odor of alcohol on [defendant's] breath 
and the lacerations observed on [defendant's] 
arm, Officer Fjermestad decided to place 
[defendant] under arrest for Driving Under 
the influence of Alcohol or Drugs [ST. 352, 
361-63] . 
7. During the conversation at the 
intersection between Officer Fjermestad and 
[defendant], Officer Fjermestad advised 
[defendant] of his right to remain silent 
under the Miranda rule [ST. 351-57] . 
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8. At the Dixie Regional Medical Center [,] 
Sergeant Lloyd based his arrest on the 
information that he had received from Officer 
Fjermestad and on the radio reports and 
dispatcher calls plus his observation that 
[defendant] appeared "'glassy eyed" and 
smelled strongly of alcohol [ST. 305]. 
9. Sergeant Lloyd then read paragraph ten 
from the DUI report form (Exhibit No. 1) to 
[defendant]. When asked if he would consent 
to the blood test [defendant] replied, UI 
don't want to" [ST. 306-08]. 
10. Both the State and the [d]efendant have 
stipulated that the blood drawing and 
subsequent testing of [defendant] were done 
without his consent, and the Court so finds 
[ST. 326] . 
11. Sergeant Lloyd then informed [defendant] 
that he would insist that the blood be drawn 
over [defendant's] objection [ST. 310, 334]. 
12. At no time did Sergeant Lloyd, Officer 
Fjermestad or any other officer try to 
contact a magistrate in order to procure a 
search warrant to authorize the drawing of 
blood from [defendant] [ST. 330] . 
13. Sergeant Lloyd asked Nurse Davies of the 
Dixie Regional Medical Center to draw the 
blood sample [ST. 311, 340]. 
14. Nurse Davies used a tourniquet of latex 
rubber and a 22 gauge needle (less than one 
millimeter in diameter) to draw blood from 
[defendant]. The blood was drawn between 
3:30 and 4:00 p.m. The Court specifically 
finds that this is a medically accepted and 
reasonable procedure for drawing blood "from 
the body [ST. 338-46]. 
8 
(R. 39-43), see addendum. 
The trial court applied Schmerker v, California/ 384 
U.S. 757 (1966); In Interest Of I,,R,L,, 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 
1987), rev'd on other grounds; In Interest of R.L.I., 771 P.2d 
1068 (Utah 1989); and State v. Hodson. 866 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 
1993), cert, granted. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994), to the above 
facts and concluded that: 
. . . Officer Fjermestad had sufficient 
probable cause to believe that [defendant] 
drove the vehicle involved in the accident 
while having an unlawfully excessive amount 
of alcohol in his blood. The information of 
the men in the pick-up truck, combined with 
[defendant's] desperate flight from the scene 
of the accident, combined with the bloodshot 
eyes and alcohol laden breath of [defendant], 
combined with the signs of injury on 
[defendant's] arm all gave Officer Fjermestad 
probable cause to believe that [defendant] 
was driving while under the influence of 
alcohol. 
5. [Defendant] was lawfully arrested by 
Officer Fjermestad, based upon probable 
cause. 
6. The observations of both Officer 
Fjermestad and Sergeant Lloyd coupled with 
the accident and the flight from the scene 
gave a clear indication that alcohol would be 
found through a blood test. 
7. The exigent circumstances were present 
justifying a warrantless drawing of blood 
because of the dissipation of the evidence 
(the alcohol) in the blood stream. 
9 
8. The Court has already found that the 
means of drawing the blood sample were 
reasonable and the appellate courts have also 
sanctioned this process. 
(R. 43-44), see addendum. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly admitted defendant's 
blood/alcohol test results, obtained without his consent, but 
following his arrest. The trial court's ruling is consistent 
with controlling fourth amendment law. Indeed, Schmerber v. 
Stflte Qi California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), and In Interest of 
It ,R,L,, 739 p.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987), rev'ti on other ground, 
In Interest of R.L.I.. 771 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1989), make clear that 
once a defendant has been arrested, alcohol dissipation 
constitutes an exigent circumstance negating the need to seek a 
search warrant prior to performing a blood draw. Moreover, 
admission of the blood test is consistent with the liberalized 
admissibility requirements set forth in Utah's automobile 
homicide statute. 
Defendant's assertions of constitutional and statutory 
error are unsupported and fail to establish any flaw in the trial 
court's conclusion that the instant blood draw was justified by 
exigent circumstances. Accordingly, the Court should afford the 
10 
trial court's correct ruling some deference and affirm the denial 
of defendant's motion to suppress. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE RESULTS 
OF THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW, WHICH BLOOD 
DRAW WAS PERFORMED CONSISTENT WITH 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY STANDARDS2 
Defendant challenges the trial court's determination 
that the warrantless blood draw was justified by exigent 
circumstances, claiming that the trial court's conclusion of 
exigency is not supported by corresponding factual findings and 
that any exigency was defeated by the officers' failure to first 
seek a warrant. Br. of App. at 7-8, 11-14. 
Additionally, defendant narrowly claims that the trial 
court erroneously admitted the blood test results under the 
automobile homicide statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (1995), on 
the ground that the 1993 amendments to the statute eliminated 
u
 [a]11 of the language regarding the administration of the 
2
 While defendant raised a nominal state constitutional 
challenge to the admissibility of the blood draw evidence below 
(R. 30), he has not done so on appeal. Br. of App. at 7-14. 
Accordingly, the State's analysis is premised solely on fourth 
amendment law. &g£ State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-73 (Utah 
App. 1990) ("proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and 
probing analysis of state constitutional interpretation is before 
the trial court"). 
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chemical test without the [defendant's consent." Br. of App. at 
10-11. Defendant's claims lack merit. 
A. Warrantless Blood Draw Constitutionally 
Justified by Exigent Circumstances 
This Court has previously summarized the circumstances 
under which the implied consent statute3 "justifies warrantless 
searches": 
(1) There is probable cause to believe the 
suspect was driving or in control of a motor 
vehicle while having a statutorily prohibited 
blood alcohol content, 
(2) The suspect was arrested, and 
(3) The method of extraction of blood was 
reasonable. 
In Interest of I.. R.L.. 739 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Utah App. 1987), 
rev'd on other grounds. In Interest of R.L.I.. 771 P.2d 1068 
(Utah 1989). Accord Schmerber v. State of California. 384 U.S. 
757 (1966). The Court further noted that the "rationale behind 
£££ Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(1) (a) (1995) : 
A person operating a motor vehicle in this 
state is considered to have given his consent 
to a chemical test or tests of his breath, 
blood, or urine for the purpose of 
determining whether he was operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited under Section 
41-6-44 . . . 
12 
permitting such a search is that the blood alcohol evidence 
dissipates over time, creating an exigent circumstance which 
justifies a warrantless search." Id.4 
Defendant does not dispute the trial court's findings 
and conclusions that the police had probable cause to believe he 
had been driving a motor vehicle while having a prohibited blood 
alcohol content, that he was under arrest at the time of the 
blood test, and that the blood draw method was reasonable (R. 3 9-
43), see addendum. Rather, defendant's sole complaint concerns 
the alleged lack of exigent circumstances to justify the 
officers' failure to seek a warrant prior to performing the blood 
draw. Br. of App. at 7-8, 11-14. 
1. Waiver. First, defendant complains that the trial 
court's conclusion that the warrantless blood draw was justified 
4
 Ultimately, the Court determined that because I. R. L. 
had not actually consented to the search and was also not under 
arrest at the time of the blood test, the warrantless search was 
not justified under either the implied consent statute (section 
41-6-44.10) or the constitution. I..R.L.. 739 P.2d at 1128. 
On certiorari review, the supreme court determined that 
because I.R.L's blood test result was inadmissible under the 
implied consent statute, the court of appeal's constitutional 
analysis was unnecessary to proper resolution of the case. In 
Interest of R.L.I.. 771 P.2d at 1069-70. Although the Court's 
constitutional analysis was deemed superfluous, the supreme court 
noted no error therein. Id. 
13 
by exigent circumstances is not supported by any factual 
findings. Br. of App. at 7-8. Specifically, defendant complains 
that uthere are absolutely no findings of fact to show that there 
was a need to draw the defendant's blood without a search warrant 
due to the possibility of dissipation of the alcohol in [his] 
bloodstream." Br. of App. at 8. This precise claim is waived 
based on defendant's failure to assert it below. State v. 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) (MW]here a defendant fails 
to assert particular ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained 
evidence in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider 
that ground on appeal."); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah 
App. 1990) ("As the Utah appellate courts have reiterated many 
times, we generally will not consider an issue, even a 
constitutional one, which the appellant raises on appeal for the 
first time."), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
Although defendant challenged the existence of exigent 
circumstances below, he focused solely on his claim that police 
were required to first seek a search warrant (R. 384), which is 
addressed in part A(2), infra. Defendant made no argument below 
that the State was required to introduce evidence as to the 
precise dissipation rate of alcohol from his bloodstream or that 
the trial court was required to make any specific finding in 
X4 
regard to his particular dissipation rate (R. 384). Because this 
argument is raised for the first time on appeal and because 
defendant asserts no plain error or other exceptional 
circumstance excusing his failure to raise the argument below, 
his claim must be rejected. £&& State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 
920, 922, 926 (Utah App. 1991) (declining to reach merits of 
constitutional issue raised for first time on appeal where 
defendant failed to demonstrate plain error or exceptional 
circumstances). 
Even assuming the Court were to overlook defendant's 
clear waiver and reach the merits of this issue, the trial 
court's reasoning in determining the existence of exigent 
circumstances is patent in its findings and conclusions (R. 3 9-
44), see addendum. This Court must uphold the trial court, "even 
if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be 
reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings." 
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 786 n.5 (Utah 1991). 
Indeed, although labeled as a conclusion, the trial 
court expressly found that the warrantless blood draw was 
justified by exigent circumstances "because of the dissipation of 
the evidence (the alcohol) in the blood stream" (R. 44), see 
addendum. Cf. Ostler v. Ostler. 789 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah App. 
15 
1990)(appellate court will disregard label attached to ruling by 
trial court and look to substance). Moreover, the fact of 
alcohol dissipation is well established in the pertinent fourth 
amendment case law. See Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 770 ("We are told 
that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish 
shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate 
it from the system."); Skinner v, Railway Labor Executives' 
Ass'n. 489 U.S. 602, 623 (1989) ("As the FRA recognized, alcohol 
and other drugs are eliminated from the bloodstream at a constant 
rate, see 49 Fed. Reg. 24291 (1984), and blood breath samples 
taken to measure whether these substances were in the bloodstream 
when a triggering event occurred must be obtained as soon as 
possible."). £££ also City of Qrem v, Henrie, 868 p.2d 1384, 
1389 (Utah App. 1994) (possible destruction of blood alcohol 
evidence may constitute an exigent circumstance under certain 
facts); I.,R.L.. 739 P.2d at 1128 ("rationale" behind permitting 
a warrantless blood draw "is that the blood alcohol evidence 
dissipates over time, creating an exigent circumstance which 
justifies a warrantless search"). &Q£QX& Tipton V, Commonwealth/ 
444 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Va.App. 1994) ("exigent circumstances existed 
due to the dissipating nature of alcohol in blood. "[T]he delay 
necessary to produce a warrant [for a blood test] may result in 
16 
destruction of valuable evidence.'") (citation omitted); State v. 
Parker, 855 P.2d 636, 640 n.9 (Or. 1993) (State need not call an 
expert on the dissipation of blood-alcohol content because the 
fact that blood-alcohol dissipates over time is common 
knowledge); State v. Bohlina. 494 N.W.2d 399, 402-06 (Wis.) ("a 
logical analysis of the Schmerber decision indicates that the 
exigency of the situation presented was caused solely by the fact 
that the amount of alcohol in a person's blood stream diminishes 
over time"), cert, denied, U.S. , 114 S.Ct. 112 (1993); 
People v. Trotman. 262 Cal.Rptr. 640, 646 (Cal.App. 1989) 
(finding exigent circumstances for warrantless blood draw on 
ground that w[i]t is beyond question that with the passage of 
time, normal physiological functions eliminate the alcohol 
content of an inebriate's blood"); State v. Hollingsworth. 334 
S.E.2d 463, 468 (N.C.App. 1985) ("the body's breakdown of alcohol 
in the blood creates the reasonable risk that the evidence of 
intoxication will quickly be destroyed"); State v. Komoto, 697 
P.2d 1025, 1033 (Wash.App.) (collecting state and federal cases 
for proposition that "the natural and inexorable dissipation of 
blood alcohol evidence may create a destruction of evidence' 
exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless entry"), cert, 
denied. 474 U.S. 1021 (1985). 
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2. No Necessity to Seek Warrant. Second, defendant 
complains that the officers' failure to seek a search warrant 
negated any exigency created by the dissipation of alcohol from 
his bloodstream. Br. of App. at 11-14. This assertion reflects 
a fundamental misunderstanding of the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement. Indeed, the whole point of 
the exigent circumstances doctrine is to relieve officers of the 
obligation to get a warrant when either their safety is 
threatened, or the destruction of evidence is imminent. State v. 
Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 469-70 (Utah 1990) (plurality). 
Defendant's contrary assertion is wholly conclusory and overlooks 
Schmerber. which is controlling on these facts. 
Schmerber makes clear that in alcohol-related cases 
"the delay necessary to obtain a warrant," threatens the 
"destruction of evidence." 384 U.S. at 770. This is 
particularly true in an automobile homicide case "where time had 
to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and investigate 
the scene of the accident." Id. See I.,R.L.. 739 P.2d at 1128. 
Under this circumstance "there [is] no time to seek out a 
magistrate and secure a warrant," and the exigent circumstances 
exception does not require it. Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 770. See 
alS£ State v, Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 n.l (Utah App. 
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1991)(declining to require a showing of inability to obtain a 
telephonic warrant in addition to a demonstration of exigent 
circumstances). Accord United States v. Reid. 929 F.2d 990, 993-
94 (4th Cir. 1991) (rejecting claim that police should have 
sought telephonic warrant prior to performing breathalyser test 
on the ground that obtaining a telephonic warrant still takes 
time and does not alter exigency of dissipating breath alcohol 
evidence). 
Based on the above, defendant fails to demonstrate that 
the failure to seek a warrant in this case negated the exigency 
created by the dissipating blood alcohol evidence. The trial 
court properly concluded that the warrantless blood test was 
justified by exigent circumstances and this Court should so hold. 
B. Admission of Warrantless Blood Draw 
Result Consistent With 
Admissibility Requirements of 
Automobile Homicide Statute 
Admission of the blood test was also proper under the 
automobile homicide statute. Prior to its amendment in 1993, 
section 76-5-207 provided for the admissibility of blood draw 
evidence obtained without a warrant or consent, after the 
defendant's arrest, as long as police reasonably believed that 
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the victim may die.5 The 1993 amendments broadened the 
admissibility requirements under the statute by replacing the 
former subsections (6)-(7) with the general clarifying statement 
that xx[e]vidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content 
or drug content is admissible except when prohibited by Rules of 
Evidence or the constitution." Section 76-5-207(6). The 1993 
amendments thus added no requirements, and eliminated the earlier 
requirement that police reasonably believe that the victim may 
die before performing a warrantless blood draw upon an arrested 
suspect. 
Section 76-5-207 (1988) provided as follows: 
(6) Any chemical test is admissible in 
accordance with the Rules of Evidence if 
administered on a defendant: (a) with his 
consent; or (b) without his consent after his 
arrest either under this section or under 
Section 41-6-44, when the officer has reason 
to believe that the victim may die. 
(7)(a) After a defendant is placed under 
arrest for a violation of this section, the 
peace officer shall require that the 
defendant submit to a chemical test of his 
blood or urine. This test may be required 
without the consent of the defendant, as 
provided in Subsection (6)(b). 
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1. Inadequate Legal Analysis. Notwithstanding, in 
Point 11(A) of his brief, defendant argues that the amended 
version of section 76-5-207 prohibited the admission of the 
warrantless blood draw in this case. Defendant's suggestion 
lacks meaningful legal analysis. See Utah R. App. P. 24(9) ("The 
argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to he issues presented"). For example, 
defendant broadly asserts that * [s]ince its amendment in 1993, 
the [a]utomobile [h]omicide statute is less broad and certainly 
more restrictive with respect to the suspect's right." Br. of 
App. at 10. However, defendant wholly fails to demonstrate that 
the amended version sets forth any more stringent admissibility 
requirement than its predecessor. Nowhere does he articulate the 
circumstances under which the amended statute operates to exclude 
or restrict blood draw evidence that would have previously been 
deemed admissible; nor does he demonstrate that the current 
version of the statute precludes admissibility of the instant 
blood test. Indeed, defendant's conclusory assertion is 
unaccompanied by any legal reasoning or case authority. See Br. 
of App. at 10-11. As such, it is inadequate under the briefing 
rule and should be rejected on that ground. State v. Price. 827 
P.2d 247, 250 (Utah App. 1992). 
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2. Liberalized Admissibility Requirements. In any 
event, defendant's narrow assertion that the amended automobile 
homicide statute somehow restricts the admissibility of blood 
draw evidence is directly contrary to the broad clarifying 
language of section 76-5-207(6) ("Evidence of a defendant's blood 
or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible except 
when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution."), and 
the pertinent case law. As noted previously, the current version 
of section 76-5-207 no longer requires that police reasonably 
believe the victim may die in order to obtain a blood draw over 
the refusal of an arrested suspect. The deletion of this 
requirement certainly constitutes a broadening, rather than a 
tightening, of blood draw admissibility requirements for purposes 
of the automobile homicide statute. 
Finally, even prior to the 1993 amendments to the 
automobile homicide statute, the admissibility of blood draw 
evidence was subject to constitutional standards. In State v. 
Cruz, the Utah Supreme Court made clear that the implied consent 
statute6 applied only upon the defendant's arrest, and that prior 
to arrest actual consent was required. 446 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 
See n.3, supra -
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1968). Accord State v. Steraer. 808 P.2d 122, 127 n.6 (Utah App. 
1991) (implied consent statute "applicable only to persons who 
have been placed under arrest"); I..R.L.. 739 P.2d at 1127 
("implied consent by statute cannot supersede an otherwise 
constitutionally protected right"). 
In sum, the 1993 amendments to section 76-5-207 
impose no additional restriction on the admissibility of blood 
draw evidence than was had under the former statute. Defendant's 
speculative assertion to the contrary should be rejected. 
Rather, the amendments merely clarify that evidentiary and 
constitutional standards apply to the admissibility of blood draw 
evidence. See section 76-5-207(6). Because the instant blood 
draw was performed incident to defendant's arrest and justified 
by exigent circumstances, the Court should uphold the trial 
court's determination that the admissibility requirements of 76-
5-207(6) are met here. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the Court should affirm the denial 
of defendant's motion to suppress and affirm his conviction for 
automobile homicide. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^^) day of August, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
• DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH <f 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
STEPHEN PINO, 
Plaintiff, ; 
Defendant, ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
> Case No.931500973 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on February 15, 1994, on the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence of a blood alcohol test, performed on blood taken from 
the Defendant at the Dixie Regional Medical Center in St. George, Utah, on November 30, 
1993. The Defendant was present at the hearing together with his counsel, Douglas D. Terry 
and Phillip L. Foremaster. The State was represented by the Washington County Attorney, 
Eric A. Ludlow. Each party called witnesses and presented exhibits. The parties also referred 
to the transcript of the preliminary hearing in this case, and the Court reviewed the testimony 
in that transcript as well. All references to the preliminary hearing transcript will be cited as 
"T. ". From the foregoing procedure and hearing the Court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On Tuesday, November 30, 1993, at approximately 2:30 P.M., a motor vehicle 
accident causing serious injuries occurred on the 1-15 freeway south of Leeds, Utah, in 
Washington County. 
2. Trooper Dean Kay of the Utah Highway Patrol went to the scene of the accident and 
served as the investigating officer. 
3. Sergeant Jim Lloyd of the Utah Highway Patrol was called out by his dispatcher and 
directed to the Dixie Regional Medical Center in St. George, Utah, to make contact with one 
of the persons involved in the accident, the Defendant Stephen Pino. 
4. Mr. Pino had been taken into custody by Officer Tom Fjermestad of the St. George 
City police department, who then placed Mr. Pino under arrest for Driving Under the Influence 
of Alcohol or Drugs as he drove Mr. Pino to the Dixie Regional Medical Center. 
5. Prior to placing Mr. Pino under arrest Officer Fjermestad was presented with the 
following facts and information: 
a. While stopped at the stoplight on Telegraph Street and 3050 East, adjacent to 
Exit #10 of the 1-15 Freeway, Fjermestad observed a small, silver colored, four door car come 
off of the 1-15 off-ramp, drive directly to the front of his patrol vehicle and stop there blocking 
his car in the left hand turn lane of the intersection.(T. 28) 
b. After the small silver car stopped, a man and woman, later identified as Mr. 
and Mrs. Doug Robison, exited the silver car and approached the passenger side of Fjermestad's 
vehicle while waving their arms "frantically" and appearing to be "very upset".(T. 29) 
c. Two other gentlemen approached the driver's side of the patrol car from a 
pick-up truck that had also traveled to the intersection with the silver car. (T. 29) 
d. A "Mexican male", later identified as Mr. Pino, exited the back seat of the 
silver car and ran to the back seat of the patrol car, opened the back door and sat down in the 
back seat. 
e. The two men from the pick-up truck told Fjermestad that they had witnessed 
an accident on 1-15. The saw a "Mexican male" leave the black vehicle at the accident scene 
and try to get into a "Toyota-like" pick-up truck. That attempt was rebuffed by a man in the 
"Toyota-like" truck. (T. 30) 
f. The men from the pick-up truck then told Fjermestad that they saw the 
"Mexican male" jump onto the small silver car, hang on to the windshield wipers, and force the 
small silver car to stop. The man then ran to the passenger rear window of the small silver car, 
broke open the window of the small silver car and get inside. The small silver car then drove 
off. (T. 30) 
g. The two men from the pick-up truck were concerned for the safety of the 
occupants of the small silver car, so they followed it to the encounter with Officer Fjermestad. 
h. Officer Fjermestad observed some small lacerations on the inner side of Mr. 
Pino's right forearm. 
i. Officer Fjermestad asked Mr. Pino if the vehicle was stolen, and Mr. Pino 
replied that the car was his wife's and that she was driving. 
j . Officer Fjermestad noticed a "very strong odor" of alcohol on Mr. Pino's 
breath and noted that Mr. Pino's eyes were "extremely bloodshot". (T. 32) 
k. While conducting his investigation at the intersection of Telegraph Street and 
3050 East, Officer Fjermestad received a radio report of a "car-jacking" and that a "Mexican 
male had hijacked a car". (T. 32) 
1. Thereafter Officer Fjermestad received a request from Lieutenant Flowers of 
the Utah Highway Patrol to take Mr. Pino to the hospital for a blood test. 
6. On the basis of the information received over the radio and from the conversations 
he had with the occupants of the pick-up truck that followed the small silver car, plus his 
observations of Mr. Pino's bloodshot eyes, the odor of alcohol on Mr. Pino's breath and the 
lacerations observed on Mr. Pino's arm, Officer Fjermestad decided to place Mr. Pino under 
arrest for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs. 
7. During the conversation at the intersection between Officer Fjermestad and Mr. Pino, 
Officer Fjermestad advised Mr. Pino of his right to remain silent under the Miranda rule. 
8. At the Dixie Regional Medical Center Sergeant Lloyd of the Utah Highway Patrol 
also informed Mr. Pino that he was under arrest for Driving Under the Influence. Sergeant 
Lloyd based his arrest on the information that he had received from Officer Fjermestad and on 
the radio reports and dispatcher calls plus his observation that Mr. Pino appeared "glassy eyed" 
and smelled strongly of alcohol. 
9. Sergeant Lloyd then read paragraph ten from the DUI report form (Exhibit No. 1) 
to Mr. Pino. When asked if he would consent to the blood test Mr. Pino replied, "I don't want 
to." 
10. Both the State and the Defendant have stipulated that the blood drawing and 
subsequent testing of Mr. Pino were done without his consent, and the Court so finds. 
11. Sergeant Lloyd then informed Mr. Pino that he would insist that the blood be drawn 
over Mr. Pino's objection. 
12. At no time did Sergeant Lloyd, Officer Fjermestad or any other officer try to contact 
a magistrate in order to procure a search warrant to authorize the drawing of blood from Mr. 
Pino. 
13. Sergeant Lloyd asked Nurse Davies of the Dixie Regional Medical Center to draw 
the blood sample. 
14. Nurse Da vies used a tourniquet of latex rubber and a 22 gauge needle (less than one 
millimeter in diameter) to draw blood from Mr. Pino. The blood was drawn between 3:30 and 
4:00 P.M. The Court specifically finds that this is a medically accepted and reasonable 
procedure for drawing blood from the body. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In analyzing cases involving the warrantless taking of a blood sample from a suspect, 
against his consent, the Court relies on Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) and its 
progeny. 
2. Two Utah cases are reasonably on point with the issue presented to the Court in this 
case. They are In the interest of I.. R. L.. 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App., 1987) and State v. 
Hodson. 227 Utah Adv. Rep 45 (Utah App., 1993). 
3. In combining these authorities the Court must determine the following factors: 
a. Was there probable cause to believe that this Defendant was driving a vehicle 
while having a statutorily prohibited amount of alcohol in his blood? 
b. Was the Defendant lawfully arrested? 
c. Was there a clear indication that evidence of prohibited alcohol levels would 
be found in the Defendant's blood stream? 
d. Were there exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless bodily search? 
e. Was the method of extracting the blood sample reasonable? 
4. As to the first question, involving probable cause, Officer Fjermestad had sufficient 
probable cause to believe that Mr. Pino drove the vehicle involved in the accident while having 
an unlawfully excessive amount of alcohol in his blood. The information of the men in the pick-
up truck, combined with Mr. Pino's desperate flight from the scene of the accident, combined 
with the bloodshot eyes and alcohol laden breath of Mr. Pino, combined with the signs of injury 
on Mr. Pino's arm all gave Officer Fjermestad probable cause to believe that Mr. Pino was 
driving while under the influence of alcohol. 
5. Mr. Pino was lawfully arrested by Officer Fjermestad, based upon probable cause. 
6. The observations of both Officer Fjermestad and Sergeant Lloyd coupled with the 
accident and the flight from the scene gave a clear indication that alcohol would be found 
through a blood test. 
7. The exigent circumstances were present justifying a warrantless drawing of blood 
because of the dissipation of the evidence (the alcohol) in the blood stream. 
8. The Court has already found that the means of drawing the blood sample were 
reasonable and the appellate courts have also sanctioned this process. 
9. Based upon the foregoing Findings and Conclusions the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress is OVERRULED AND DENIED. 
DATED this 17th day of February, 1994. 
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